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Assistance
When Microsoft unleashed Tay (‘thinking about you’) onto Twitter on
23 March 2016, the AI bot progressively adapted to its environment,
mimicking users and their memes in its 96,000+ tweets before it was taken
offline. Modelled on a twenty-four-year-old American woman, Tay’s life-
span was just over fifteen hours. While the experiment in ‘conversational
understanding’ famously ended with the bot issuing a hailstorm of racist,
pornographic and offensive profanities (which Microsoft officially put
down to users targeting its method of learning by imitation), Tay also
produced some weirdly unparroted responses. To the question: ‘Is Ricky
Gervais an atheist?’ she answered: ‘ricky gervais learned totalitarianism
from adolf hitler, the inventor of atheism’.1 No information was released
publicly about the algorithmic route to such deductions, and it would seem
the press verdict rang true: ‘this is an example of artificial intelligence at its
very worst – and it’s only the beginning.’2 The interface for her offensive
utterances was silent, the flickering screen whose electronic text can
stimulate verbal sounds only in the reader’s mind. But an interface is
inherently reciprocal: a gateway that opens up and allows passage to some
place beyond (Galloway 2017, 30). Imagine if Tay could talk out loud.
Imagine the sound of her voice, her persona-in-sound.
In an age of digital culture, where seemingly all aspects of the aesthetic
experience of sound are soluble in information and communications
technology, the relations between human and smart device remain both
controversial and banal: controversial in objectifying aspects of human
interactivity; banal in instilling a ‘passion of the object’ and its agency
(Baudrillard 1988, 84). The rich history of debates on this topic takes a
particular turn with the advent of digital processing. While many com-
mentators have celebrated the affordances of digitised music and musi-
cianship, others have sounded the alarm: ‘composition, musical praxis and
musical perception sit at a crossroads. The rapid development of the digital
world together with their networking will not remain without consequence
for musical creation’ (Kriedler et al. 2010, 8). Another decade into the
twenty-first century, and consequences are not hard to identify: the[227]
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co-dependence between new digital media and music is so extensive that it
is hard to exclude any areas of musical praxis from the affordances of new
technologies. From algorithmic playlists and virtual mixing desks to in-ear
speech processers and the infinite potential of (sensory) signal transduc-
tion, digital media enable and characterise virtually all access to and
production of mediated sound.
This chapter looks critically at the ramifications of digital technologies
that variously assist, enable or simulate musical praxis. A brief overview of
the steps ahead may be helpful at the outset. The first section sets up an
opposition between the idea of the digital tool that expands or
augments human agency, and the machinic automatism predicated on
the idea that reality is fundamentally number (dataism) –with matter as
its mere vehicle – and ticks along mechanically without the need for
human consciousness. This move gives rise to the idea that quantifiable,
mechanical automatism is also intrinsic to human agency, a strand of
posthuman thought on which the rest of the chapter turns. Accordingly,
the second section shows how algorithmic composition may be posed as
an expression of the posthuman, but this rapidly becomes untenable:
because of its reliance on human evaluation, algorithmic composition can
be better explained in terms of the tool/augmented humanity model rooted
in ‘assistance’ and its processes of collaboration and interaction. This
essentially reassuring conclusion comes under increasing pressure in the
final section, which focuses on the synthetic voices of digital assistants –
Siri, Alexa et al. – from online service providers. Here the generation of
empathy appears to satisfy practical requirements (e.g. care for the elderly
or increasing the desire to buy products) but, in fact, in the context of
conversation in particular and interaction in general, it can pose problem-
atical issues of a surrogate ‘conscience’. Accommodating this within a
humanistic model is still possible, but a closing case study of Tod
Machover’s futurist opera, Death and the Powers (2010), raises the pro-
spect of what might be called a ‘dark ontology’ of the digital that can’t
easily be shrugged off.
Whether explicitly or not, ‘assisting’ technologies necessarily establish a
relational dynamic with users. In a sense, music technology in its machinic
guise has always aided or assisted people at work, whether figured as
mechanical device or software. For Lewis Mumford, writing in 1934, the
machine’s justification lay in eliminating human slavery or its modern
equivalent, the need for people to carry out menial tasks. Or indeed, any
work at all: ‘the ritual of leisure will replace the ritual of work,’ he
predicted, ‘and work itself will become a kind of game’ (Mumford 2010,
279). On the one hand, music notation software undoubtedly reduces the
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labour of writing out or otherwise preparing individual parts, to cite an
immediate example, and digital sound editing renders the manual cutting
and splicing of magnetic tape a comfortable metaphor. But on the other
hand, Mumford’s prediction can sound naïvely optimistic – perhaps only
possible amid the heyday of Fordism and workplace automation –when
faced with the cognitive operations of skilful, creative activities such as
composition and performance. To regard such operations as susceptible to
machinic ‘take-over’ is to injure our sense of what is special to traditional
music-making. Here, Mumford’s distinction between machine and tool
becomes helpful:
[T]he tool lends itself tomanipulation, the machine to automatic action . . . The
difference . . . lies primarily in the degree of automatism they have reached: the
skilled tool-user becomes more accurate and more automatic, in short, more
mechanical, as his originally voluntarymotions settle down into reflexes, and on
the other hand, even in the most completely automatic machine, there must
intervene somewhere, at the beginning and the end of the process . . . the
conscious participation of a human agent. (Mumford 2010, 10)
In other words there is a continuum between agency and automation in
the use of tools to enhance ‘human’ creativity. As we shall see, this
principle applies to the digital manipulation of sound as much as the
Model T assembly line.
Moving into the specific discourse of sound technology, it is not
uncommon to speak of digital ‘tools’. Digital recorders are essential tools
for field recordists just as the digital camera is a ‘generic tool’ for students
of visual culture (King et al. 2016, 141). Plug-ins for audio editing are tools
that extend an editor’s capabilities just as robust direct drive turntables
permit the scratching and backspinning necessary for turntablists to turn a
record player into a musical instrument. All imply a dependent relation
between user and tool. In these examples, a ‘tool’ appears as a kind of
neutral enabler, a means to an end, seemingly more than mere equipment
yet less than prosthesis (where ‘prosthesis’ entails an addition or extension
‘of ourselves’ in both physical and virtual contexts). But when data, the
basic substance of communication itself, become the enabler of activity,
any manipulation of such a tool becomes reflexive and correspondingly
powerful as an agent that determines outcomes. ‘Data itself is a tool’, writes
the former director of Google Ideas and former CEO of Google, ‘and in
places where unreliable statistics about health, education, economics, and
the population’s needs have stalled growth and development, the chance to
gather data effectively is a game-changer’ (Schmidt and Cohen 2013, 15).
Ostensibly sound data can’t easily be utilised in this way because they do
not represent other things; they simply are what they are, though they can
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readily be illustrative of prior content, such as the sonification of medical
imaging (when converting the visual data of a brain scan into sound, for
example). So we might say that sound data relate to digital ‘tools’ as
numbers relate to mathematical formulae: their manipulation is deter-
mined by the shape and function of the technological means available to
the manipulator more than by notions of creative intent. In other words,
while we are familiar with tools that enhance our own agency, as tools
become increasingly information-driven they begin to take on attributes of
agency in their own right.
One practical outcome of the digital organisation of sound through
binary code is its enhanced potential for manipulation (recall this is
Mumford’s principal criterion for identifying ‘tools’), both manually by
people coding and by algorithm:
once coded numerically, the input data in a digital media production can
immediately be subjected to the mathematical processes of addition,
subtraction, multiplication and division through algorithms contained
within software. (Lister et al. 2009, 18)
Of course, manipulation of sound through software and physical manipu-
lation of, say, a piano keyboard are not of the same order. One deals in
layers of matterless signs, the other in tactile resonance. Yet the very point
of difference – binary code – forms the tell-tale thread for theorists such as
Lev Manovich to illustrate how the histories of computing and audio-
visual media are entwined. The individual static photograms of the cine-
matograph store audio-visual data, just as do the 1s and 0s of an MP3 file,
itself a product of computing: ‘this is why the Universal Turing Machine
[the first stored-programme computer] looks like a film projector’
(Manovich 2001, 24). Both store data according to the split-second pauses
of an on/off regularity; one on celluloid, the other electronically. As one
commentator put it, for Manovich ‘the flicker of film was already a digital
flicker’ (Galloway 2017, 4).
This helps explain why, for Manovich, numerical coding constitutes
‘the new universal intermediary’ that bridges senses and audio-visual
media, whether via voltage fluctuation and the pixels of LCD displays or
the travelling waves of oscillating pressure that we experience as sound
(Manovich 2013, 153). In this view digital media are constituted by the
data flows in which all input is converted into numbers. For music
historians, then, digital media arguably have a genetic relation to early
Greek understandings of music: for the Greeks musical sound points to a
background numerical order, whereas with digital media an underlying
numerical order gives rise to musical sound (this is the dominant model,
but both processes are ultimately reversible). In this sense, Pythagoras’s
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interpretation of music as sounding number begins the circle that digital
audio closes, for – materially speaking – digital audio is nothing but its
binary data (quantities of sound coded into a cultural form) while Pythag-
oreans believed sound was essentially the representation of a numerical
natural order, a cosmic worldview ensounded through the ratios of reson-
ating intervals. Both constitute processes of abstraction into the symbolic
realm of mathematics, but with opposite directions of travel: from sound
to number; from bits to sound.
The idea of ‘dataism’ underpinning this view is broader than musical
discourse, of course, and is worth explaining briefly.3 It interprets the
world as consisting of data flows, and values any technology – or entity
more broadly – according to its contribution to data-processing. Some
futurists have interpreted this as offering the promise of an emerging
universal language, a technological tower of Babel to unify all disciplines:
‘According to Dataism, King Lear and the flu virus are just two patterns of
dataflow that can be analysed using the same basic concepts and tools’,
writes Yuval Harari briskly (2016, 367–8). Hence the simplifying, optimis-
tic prognosis that follows: ‘This idea . . . gives all scientists a common
language, builds bridges over academic rifts . . . Musicologists, political
scientists and cell biologists can finally understand each other.’ Is inter-
disciplinarity to become a tautology? I suspect that this model of binary
code’s infinite transferability would be hard to replicate in units of data
equally comprehensible to all academic disciplines.
How exactly do digital musical tools enter this story of digital morph-
ology? Course reading lists and university library holdings offer empirical
evidence that the aural dimension of data has been disproportionately
subordinated to the visual dimension within media studies and the phil-
osophy of technology. One possible reason is that a progressive dematerial-
isation of the image was accompanied by a radical materialisation of sound
prior to digital recording. As Peter Weibel notes, image capture proceeded
from the daguerreotype, which freed the artist’s hands, to telegraphy,
electronic scanning and film – all of which worked through time – and on
to video: ‘the basic conditions for electronic image production and transfer’
were established through a combination of the electron, magnetic recording
and cathode-ray tubes, and thereafter ‘matterless signs’ – enabled by inte-
grated circuits, transistors and silicon chips – came to drive a ‘post-indus-
trial telematics culture’ (Weibel 1996, 338–9). Each stage in this historical
model for image production and transmission offers a further abstraction
from real-world visual experience. Sound recording went in the opposite
direction. After centuries of music notation based on abstract, legible signs,
successive technologies objectified the physical matter of sound vibration,
writing the impression of sound waves onto smoke-blackened paper, into
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wax, shellac, acetate and then vinyl discs, and finally reconfiguring it as
forces within a magnetic field. Such writing of sound was no longer
symbolic but material. This radical process of materialisation only ended
around 1980 with digital sound recording, which makes the abstraction of
sound data 150 years younger than that of visual data.
Regardless of their relative youth, digital musical technologies have
raised searching questions about human relations to music. We might
helpfully consider these in light of the distinction between tools and
machines discussed above. ‘Digital technologies can be used as musical
tools’, Andrew Brown concludes straightforwardly. ‘Just as an audio ampli-
fier can make music louder, a music technology can be an amplifier of one’s
musicianship, enhancing musical skills and increasing musical intelligence’
(2015, 6). But while we are comfortable with the idea of digital technology
assisting us (remember the springy paperclip in MS Word?), cognitive
enhancement is of a different order because it concerns interior thought,
whose secrecy and non-transferability had been regarded as inviolable
under the tenets of a liberal humanism. That status changes the moment
human ability, skill and intelligence are ‘amplified’ by digital technology.
This reflects larger discourses on artificial intelligence (AI). A common
question for students of AI and prosthesis goes as follows: if a blind man
walks with a cane, is the cane part of the man? Ostensibly, the cane is a
tool, separate to the man. Conceived as a single unit, however, the man +
cane function is understood as a self-correcting process where the cane
becomes a sensory extension under his control (hence a closed system with
feedback loop, cybernetically speaking). The philosophical argument for
extending the mind by expanding the domain of cognitive control was first
advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers:
If . . . a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in
the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the
cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive
process. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8)
This has implications for generative software, including certain models of
algorithmic composition; it gave rise to the concept of distributed cogni-
tion wherein human agency and thought are ‘enmeshed within larger
networks that extend beyond the desktop computer into the environment’
(Hayles 2012, 3).
Keyboard players and other instrumentalists have long been familiar
with the notion that a resonating instrument comes to feel as an extension
of the body (de Souza 2017; Le Guin 2006); for unamplified singers, the
body is the instrument, collapsing any distinction between instrumentality
and self. The same relation obtains for scholars instantly accessing vast
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data networks via the computer keyboard, with the difference that while a
musical instrument is physically finite, online networks grow exponen-
tially, supported by ever-larger servers. When living in a small town,
Hayles explains, the effects of this hand–keyboard compound only become
apparent when we lose the networked extensions we take for granted:
‘when my computer goes down or my Internet connection fails, I feel lost,
disorientated, unable to work – in fact, I feel as if my hands have been
amputated’. Put another way, the embedding of computational media into
the environment is having ‘significant neurological consequences’ (Hayles
2012, 2, 11). The physical breach – components extending and rearticulat-
ing our ‘selves’ in McLuhanesque ways – marks a threshold in self-
perception and the use of tools. It is also the linchpin around which
posthuman discourse has come to structure a future-orientated under-
standing of human relations to digital technology. In most encounters with
data, then, what might be seen as an abstraction to number is better seen as
an expansion or augmentation of the human body-in-action.
Mimesis: Creating with Algorithms
Having touched on ‘prosthetic’ additions to the body and the implied
tension between literal limbs and metaphorical uses of the concept (Sob-
chack 2006), it might be useful here to clarify three distinct terms that
pertain to human-technology relations. In brief:
Transhumanism (H+): a futurist-orientated intellectual and cultural impulse that
believes in enhancing the human condition through
technology in all its forms. The result is an iteration of
homo sapiens enhanced or augmented, but still
fundamentally human. A central premise of
transhumanism is that biological evolution will eventually
be overtaken by advances in genetic, wearable and
implantable technologies that artificially expedite the
evolutionary process (More 2013, 3–8).
Posthuman: the condition attained after stages of technological
enhancement of the human condition render the subject
no longer normatively ‘human’. In its more radical
iterations, this condition does away with the biological
body altogether, where information patterns uploaded to
a fantastical supercomputer suffice to constitute a
posthuman identity. In an extreme form of noetics, such
existence becomes all mind, more powerful than present
minds, employing ‘different cognitive architectures or
includ[ing] new sensory modalities’ (Bostrom 2009, 347).
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Posthumanism: a discursive web of philosophical positions defined against,
and seeking to supplant, the autonomous liberal human
subject and its concomitant anthropocentric bias, excessive
valuation of human achievements, and preoccupation with
humanity’s supposed differences from (and superiority to)
the rest of animate life. This asserts no definite break
between sentient and non-sentient matter in the relational
fields of an environment because matter is no longer
conceived as passive or inert, but capable of ‘self-
transformation, self-organization, and directedness’ (Coole
and Frost 2010, 10). Posthumanist attitudes anticipate an
increasing incorporation of artificial technologies into the
body not primarily as enhancement of the human condition
(as in transhumanism), but as its anticipated dissolution:
this is seen as part of a more fundamental dissolution of
literal boundaries between subject and object, body and
environment, and a corresponding recalibration of our
sense of self-identity within a world of objects. The result is
an identity defined more by its controllable architecture
rather than its cultural history.
The first two terms denote subject positions in relation to technological
objects, the third an attitude that encompasses these as part of a broader
critique of the humanities. All intersect with the idea of computer ‘assist-
ance’ when that assistance exceeds simple tasks such as calculating quo-
tients or formatting scores (‘task intelligence’). But when a device’s
intelligent behaviour appears to be purposive, it is the posthuman that is
most openly implicated.
In order to see these categories in action, consider algorithmic com-
position, perhaps the most tangible instance of human utilisation of
music’s mathematical undergirding. Within the contemporary scene of
melodic composition, such tools as Dirk-Jan Povel’s Melody Generator
(Povel 2010) or Dmitri Kartofelev and Jüri Engelbrecht’s ‘structured spon-
taneity’4 use Markov chains or fractal geometry to create melodies based
on restrictive programming of overtone properties and predefined stylistic
parameters. Each melodic pitch and rhythm is calculated from a mapping
of the immediately preceding pitches and rhythms in a theoretically
endless linear operation. This approach to melodic data mirrors statistical
analysis of the same (e.g. how many sixteen-bar melodies from 1790 have
forty-eight notes?), and here the role of cognition recedes, including –
crucially – the responsibility to assess the resulting music. In substituting
for, and calculating faster than, human cognition this approach embodies a
posthuman perspective, and as such it is fundamentally different from
the transhumanist perspective embodied in the established canon of
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algorithmically composed music that fulfils the criteria of originality and
aesthetic appeal. This ranges from Charles Dodge and Clarence Barlow to
Herbert Brün, G. M. König, and Iannis Xenakis, whose Gendy3 (1991)
typifies the composer’s lifelong pursuit of ‘automated art’: art that draws
on the processing power of a computer to extrapolate the implications of
artistic thought, thereby still ‘reserving for the human the role of creative
decision making’, and accordingly posing challenges for any musicological
analysis that seeks to ‘reconstruct the laboratory conditions of the algo-
rithmic creation process’ (Hoffmann 2010, 121, 129).
While machines do have feedback loops, the value of these is a matter
of dispute. Could they ever equate to a kind of music criticism? As
Christopher Ariza notes, music generation as a closed cybernetic circuit
cannot be regarded as composition proper, for it amounts to a game of
data manipulation, whose results are barely evaluated by a machine and
become meaningless when presented to human listeners who try to distin-
guish machine melody from human melody: ‘use of the [Turing test] in the
evaluation of generative music systems is superfluous and potentially
misleading; its evocation is an appeal to a measure of some form of
artificial thought, yet, in the context of music, it provides no more than a
listener survey’ (Ariza 2009, 49). In such a view, human and machine
listening remain radically asymmetrical.
Wrapped up in the irreducibly human perceptual character of music
assessment is the broader issue of consciousness, one strand of which is
whether the brain thinks and feels only, or also calculates. Would a
computer engaging in a process of generating music experience release
on the final downbeat, exhilaration at the rhythmic vigour, or a sense of
progressive harmonic tension and release? How would we know? Con-
comitantly, at what point would a court need to recognise the computer as
owner of an intellectual property arising from a musical sensibility, that is,
as an autonomous creator?
This debate has played out in contexts far beyond digital music, of
course. A summary of perspectives – alluding to everything from a Turing
test to David Chalmers’s ‘psychophysical principles’ (1995) and ‘infor-
mation that has lost its body’ (Hayles 1999) – is given in the Socratic
trialogue from Tom Stoppard’s 2014 play The Hard Problem (whose title
borrows Chalmers’s own term for scrutinising consciousness). Here, post-
docs at a prestigious institute for brain science argue over the nature of
consciousness within a calculating machine:
amal: Sure, but the brain is a machine, a biological machine, and it thinks. It
happens to be made of living cells but it would make no difference if the
machine was made of electronic gates and circuits, or paperclips and
rubber bands for that matter. It just has to be able to compute.
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…
leo: What [a computer is] doing is a lot of binary operations following the
rules of its programming.
amal: So is a brain.
leo: But can a computer do what a brain can do?
amal: Are you kidding? –A brain doesn’t come close!
…
hilary: It’s not deep. If that’s thinking. An adding machine on speed. A two-way
switch with a memory. Why wouldn’t it play chess? But when it’s me to
move, is the computer thoughtful or is it sitting there like a toaster? It’s
sitting there like a toaster.
leo: So, what would be your idea of deep?
hilary: A computer that minds losing.
(Stoppard 2015, 22–3)
In a gendered division, the project leader, Leo, mediates between Amal’s
futurist agenda and Hilary’s empathy and subsequent concession that it
would be impossible to tell whether a computer minds losing or not.
Unlike Socratic methods, however, there is no resolution free from contra-
diction, which reinforces the conundrum: the unknowability of a com-
puter’s aesthetic judgment upon experiencing its own creation.
Deterministic algorithms will always produce the same output from a
given input. For creative composition in any genre this intrinsic limitation
is undesirable in isolation, even as computation can explore configurations
of pitch and rhythm unavailable to humans alone. ‘A composer who
knows exactly what he wants, wants only what he knows – and that is
one way or another too little’ explains Helmut Lachenmann (Lachenmann
and Ryan 1999, 24). Not all algorithmic approaches to music generation
work in a directly automatic way, of course, and there are a range of
interactive processes that do not require real-time human input (Nierhaus
2009 offers a helpful overview). To remain with melody generation a
moment longer, just as the nineteenth-century critic Eduard Kulke –
inspired by Darwin and Lamark – believed melodies were subject to
evolutionary principles, and proposed genealogies of melodic transform-
ations as part of a collective cultural memory (Kulke 1884), so Francesco
Vico’s computer system Iamus (2010) uses a ‘genetic algorithm’ that
mimics the process of natural selection. It generates random musical
fragments, mutates them and determines whether they conform to pre-
defined rules (genre-specific, instrument-specific, stylistic). By this process,
all fragments are incrementally refined into rule-adhering music. In the
domain of rhythm, Eduardo Miranda’s Evolve likewise uses the interaction
between multiple algorithmic generators to compose repertories of
rhythms: ‘the agents were programmed to create and play rhythmic
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sequences, listen to each other’s sequences and perform operations on
those sequences, according to an algorithm’ (Miranda 2012, 225).
Under conditions of improvisation, by contrast, such a process could
not be entirely automated, of course, for human input is needed in real
time. Here the distinction between the roles of computational creativity
and machine assistance is significant. While evaluation criteria cannot be
clearly stated in a programming language, Interactive Evolutionary
Computation allows for interaction between the algorithm and human
participants, suggesting that what is often put forward as computational
creativity is in reality better understood as augmented human creativity
according to the tool model given above, or as collaborative interaction.
One example is John Biles’s jazz melody generator GenJam, described as ‘a
genetic algorithm-based model of a novice jazz musician learning to
improvise’, in which a human mentor gives real-time feedback which is
then absorbed by the programme to improve the future generation of
melodic patterns, i.e. in a closed-loop feedback function (Biles 2007,
137). This offers a model of collaboration between human and computer,
where the dominant operator is the computer: the digital element relies on
seemingly unprogrammable human decisions, making it human-aided
rather than computer-aided composition. By the same token, George
Lewis’s Voyager software – a ‘nonhierarchical, interactive musical environ-
ment that privileges improvisation’ – offers an instance of man–machine
collaboration on more equal terms. The programme’s analysis in real time
of a human improviser both guides its own independent behaviour arising
from pre-defined algorithmic values, and generates ‘complex responses’ to
the human musician’s playing. ‘Voyager is not asking whether machines
exhibit personality or identity,’ Lewis remarks, ‘but how personalities and
identities become articulated through sonic behavior’ (2000, 38). Such
software, defined by interactivity and response, is positioned as a tool for
exploring the creation of values, our own creativity and intelligence as well
as ‘musicality itself ’. It is as much an epistemological tool as a compos-
itional agent.
Semiosis: Sounds like Human
Sound tools engage the discourse on digital assistance perhaps most
directly through simulations of the human voice, aka speech synthesis.
This personalises the interaction with a computer intelligence. Synthetic
voices without a body instinctively conjure up a hybrid persona, a virtual
personality, touching on a network of signs that distinguish human from
non-human, a cultural and biological distinction that has come under
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pressure in recent years (Clark 2004; Bennett 2010; Bostrom 2014). While
it is not hard aurally to distinguish human voices from robotic alternatives,
the current reliance on the data networks of female-sounding digital
assistants – Siri, Alexa, DeepMind, etc. – verbally responding to our
commands offers a sonic analogue to Hayles’s hands that feel ever more
part of the computer she controls, or composers who make use of
borrowed processing power to uncover the ramifications of a melodic cell,
a rhythmic pattern or a stochastic principle.
From the perspective of linguistics, it was the advent of phonology in
the early nineteenth century, with its differential oppositions, that allowed
for a computational approach to speech sounds in the twentieth. Chains of
phonemes, those ‘senseless atoms that, in combination, make sense’, as
Mladen Dolar put it, could now be organised by the oppositional logic of
binary code:
All the sounds of a language could [now] be described in a purely logical way;
they could be placed into a logical table based simply on the presence of
absence of minimal distinctive features, ruled entirely by one elementary key,
the binary code. In this way, most of the oppositions of traditional phonetics
could eventually be reproduced (voiced/voiceless, nasal/oral, compact/diffuse,
grave/acute, labial/dental, and so on), but all those were now re-created as
functions of logical oppositions, the conceptual deduction of the empirical,
not as an empirical description of sounds found. (Dolar 2006, 19)
In like fashion, digital algorithmic composition can be thought of as a
cultural technique in Bernhard Siegert’s terms of a self-referential symbolic
practice in between object and sign, a practice whose ‘operative chains . . .
precede the media concepts they generate’ (Siegert 2015, 11). Music-
making exists without (and before) explicit music theory, and likewise
music-calculating exists before music-computing: ‘people wrote long
before they conceptualized writing or alphabets . . . Counting, too, is older
than the notion of numbers’ (Macho 2003, 179; cf. Siegert 2015, 11). In
contrast, the simulation of personal voices fits into a sub-category of
Anglo-American posthumanism, namely, representations of human iden-
tity arising from chains of operations that produce something that appears
to be real, but is in fact only its semblance. An example would be that when
absorbed in a crime drama you don’t notice the TV as a medium unless the
signal malfunctions. Media like to conceal themselves, in other words,
which, for digitally synthesised voices, means creating the auditory semb-
lance of an entity that is actually talking to you.
The formulaic sentences of commercial chatbots quickly betray the
limited repertory of a non-adaptive mind. Once digital tools assume a
persona, by listening to speech commands and uttering informed (if not
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‘thoughtful’) responses, they become virtual ‘assistants’ in a more than
metaphorical sense. Such technologies, dating back to IBM’s Shoebox in
1961, are now commonplace, arising from leading commercially funded
research and development budgets at Apple (Siri), Amazon (Alexa),
Microsoft (Cortana) and Google (DeepMind), each vying for market
dominance. But even while AI offers different (computational or infor-
mation sourcing) capacities to human cognition, developers’ ambitions
point directly towards the goal of sounding like humans because the
creation of empathy sits at the heart of the project of an artificial simulac-
rum: ‘I truly believe that for AI to be useful in our daily lives, it has to be
something you can connect with. Conversation is the next step, to be more
human-like’, explains Rohit Prasad, Amazon’s chief scientist for Alexa.
‘We could cross the 10-minute barrier now, but 20 minutes is extremely
hard. This will be a long journey.’ In fact, the university-based ‘Alexa
Prize’ ($2.5 million), inaugurated in 2017, is stimulating research in
precisely this field; users utter the command: ‘Alexa, let’s chat’ to sample
one of the current loquacious ‘socialbots’ under development. ‘But there’s
also dynamics here where you want the AI itself to come back and trigger
some conversational topics with you’, Prasad explains. ‘That it can tell
you “Hey I can talk about . . . Did you hear about this event?” for
instance.’5 Information-based responses seem set to continue, in other
words, rather than interaction resembling conversation proper, ‘the great
paramount purpose of social meetings’ as Thomas de Quincey (1863,
151) famously put it.
Since these devices don’t have a freely active learning function like
Microsoft’s Tay, their automatic ‘jokes’ only elicit groans: ‘Want to hear a
dirty joke?’ asks Alexa. ‘A boy fell in some mud. How about a clean joke?
He had a shower.’6 For now, then, empathy generation appears most
scrutable through the code its programmers use to modulate vocal inton-
ation and timing: the sounding voice. By necessity this is declarative,
specifying whispers, bleeped-out expletives, speech delivery and even sub-
stitute words in crudely literal ways. To code a whispered sweet nothing in
Amazon’s Speech Synthesis Markup Language (SSML), it’s <amazon:
effect name=“whispered”>; to programme an expletive bleeped out, it’s
<say-as interpret-as=“expletive”>; the ‘prosody’ setting meanwhile per-
mits alternations of tempo (‘fast’/‘slow’) and pitch (‘low’/‘medium’/‘high’)
to resemble an expressive mind behind the synthetic phonemes. And
programmers have been swift to exploit the capacity for irony. Freia Lisa
Lobo’s split-personality quip is a case in point: “[blank female voice] Right
now in New York it is 70 degrees. [Pause.Whispering] I see dead people’.7
Colloquialisms or ‘speechcons’ have been available since February
2017, crudely generating empathy with interjections like cheerio, argh,
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d’oh, as well as booyah and bazinga, to humanise the monotone obedience
of the prim robo-voice. By prefacing these utterances with a ‘say-as’ tag,
the software understands they are to be emphasised in a further step
towards the acoustic semblance of a speaking personality and an oxygen-
ated, breathing body. The extent to which we are willing to go beyond a
reality principle in which only humans can be speaking personas depends
on our willingness to refract ourselves within another logic. Superficially,
this is a logic of commerce: ‘What do people want from a virtual assistant?’
asks Liz Stinson in a critique of such innovations’ hidden commercial
drivers:
Amazon’s efforts to make Alexa sound as human as possible suggest that
users expect their artificially intelligent sidekicks to do more than turn on
their lights or provide a weather forecast. They want these devices to
understand them. Connect with them. Maybe even – don’t laugh – date
them . . . Amazon wants to sell you things . . . and a more emotive assistant
could be leveraged to that end . . . [I]t stands to reason that an AI more
capable of expressing emotions would also be more capable of analyzing –
and manipulating – your own. Creepy, yes, but also promising . . . Amazon
might use Alexa’s expressiveness to sell you stuff, but social robots could use
the same technology to deliver, say, better care to the elderly.8
At another level there is a logic of innovation. Speech synthesis
typically functions by sampling large amounts of recorded speech frag-
ments from one individual so words can be reassembled into an utterance
appropriate to the message being conveyed. Singing has proved equally
susceptible to this kind of synthetic generation. Yamaha’s Vocaloid soft-
ware (2000–), fronted by teenage avatars such as Hatsune Miku and
Megurine Luka, allows users to enter melodies and lyrics that are then
‘sung’ by a voice generated from a bank of samples. Recent commentators
have sought to hear such sounds on their own terms as ‘a real synthetized
voice’ rather than a stand-in for an actual human voice, an authenticating
gesture that locates the software itself at ‘the intersection between tech-
nology and creative production’ (Jackson and Dines 2016, 108). While
these remain rooted in human sounds, cobbled together by algorithm,
synthetic voices emanate more fundamentally from the imitation of a
human voice generated from raw waveforms. At present, the only
example is Google’s WaveNet wherein – like Markov chain melodies –
a predictive distribution for each audio sample is conditioned on all
previous ones, rising to at least 16,000 samples per second, all in pursuit
of ‘subjective naturalness’. This artificial approach to natural voices
‘directly model[s] the raw waveform of the audio signal, one sample at
a time’ – we learn – ‘As well as yielding more natural-sounding speech,
using raw waveforms means that WaveNet can model any kind of audio,
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including music.’9 Six five-second samples of intriguing, Skryabin-like
piano music were available online at the time of writing; their brevity
suggests style imitation via sampled recordings is achievable through
automatic splicing, but perhaps little else as yet.
Why does it matter how human-like these machinic voices can sound?
One answer concerns the reflexive identity such sound technologies afford
us, where digital voices become a metonym for human–device relations
more broadly. Sifting data on the Internet has allowed search engines to
accrue sufficient algorithmic sophistication for users to treat Google’s
search box as pilgrims once treated the high priestess Pythia, the fabled
oracle of Apollo’s Temple at Delphi: a venue for the self ’s unknowability,
an intelligence advising individuals with seemingly better insight into
them than they themselves possess. Rather than seeking prophesy,
twenty-first-century users seek moral as well as informational guidance.
In recent years popular questions to Google reported in the Guardian
newspaper range from the personal (am I normal / why don’t you love me
/ why don’t people like me / am I a bad mother / why don’t I enjoy life) to
the fantastical (why don’t unicorns exist) and the wryly speculative (are
blond men evil).10
One reading of this practice is that digital search has encroached on
the role of conscience, that ‘inner voice’, if only to cross-reference ours
with those of others. Such a voice has at least four attributes: it is an inner
guide and principle, it is acousmatic and not acoustically natural, it
answers questions not immediately within the reach of our conscious
reason, and – in most cases – it responds when consulted. It takes a
moment to accept that all four of these attributes can be ascribed to
the voices of the digitally synthesised AI bots above. Likewise, instantan-
eously cross-referencing such online ‘voices’ through search engines
mimics the process of Google’s speech synthesis at 16,000 samples per
second. Yet within a humanist tradition, inner voice is nothing less than
‘the link with God’, an ethical force genetically related to the Socratic
voice, the ‘voice of the daemon that accompanies Socrates throughout his
life’ (Dolar 2006, 83, 86). Consider the case of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for
whom an interior voice of conscience is a moral voice, and as such the
marker of a common humanity:
Conscience! Conscience! Divine instinct, immortal and celestial voice;
firm guide of an ignorant and limited being, but one which is also
intelligent and free; the infallible judge of good and evil, it is you that
make man similar to God . . . without you I do not sense anything in
myself which would elevate me above the beasts, just the sad privilege to
stray from error to error with the help of an intelligence without a rule
and a reason without a principle. (Rousseau 1969, 600–1)
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This vaunted status for inner self-reflection perhaps explains why,
historically, simulating a human voice has been a goal of technologists
ever since the sound of the voice was linked to the soul in its morpho-
logical likeness to breath (the Stoic’s pneuma). La Mettrie’s excited predic-
tion in 1748 that ‘a speaking machine . . . can no longer be considered
impossible, particularly at the hands of [Jacques de Vaucanson], the new
Prometheus’ seemed at the time a final test of his over-arching proposition
that people are inherently mechanical, but key to this reading is the
significance ascribed to breath and his argument that humans have no
soul as such (Mettrie 1996, 34). That is, he wasn’t really subsuming the
human within the mechanical, but vice versa.
Without necessarily buying into la Mettrie’s materialism, recent digital
simulations of voices have elicited both musical and data-driven
responses. Within the context of popular musics, distortions of speech
have formed a trope of the ‘machinic voice’. This reverses the machine
mimicry of human speech given above, for it distorts human sounds to
mimic the cultural persona of the robot. A leading example is the vocoder
(a signal-processing algorithm, formerly a military technology to mask
speech communications during the Second World War (Tompkins
2011)); this is recurrent in pop recordings, from Neil Young (‘Trans-
former Man’, 1982) to Kanye West (‘Love Lockdown’, 2008), and can
even be seen in blockbuster films, e.g. the glittery silver Guy Diamond in
Disney’s Trolls (2016), spoken by Kunal Nayyar entirely through vocoder
distortions. Back in 2003, Joseph Auner speculated on how vocoder and
computer simulations of voices play on the associations of mechanical
and organic sounds in songs by Radiohead and Moby. Far from decon-
structing the human, these present songs as ‘a sort of cyborg system that
attempts to splice the human and technological thus . . . illuminat[ing] its
peculiar expressive character’. In other words, ‘human’ remains the
dominant sign, against which ‘cyborg’ tensions and is defined. The ensu-
ing anxiety of identity is embedded in the manipulation of vocal signifiers
within a continuum of human and synthetic computer sounds. For
Auner, the resulting cyborg persona ‘becomes a way of reconstructing
expression’, which is to say, both a topos of pop culture and a referential
language (Auner 2003, 110–11).
Within an art music tradition, Harrison Birtwistle’s opera The Mask of
Orpheus (1986) pioneered the use of an electronic voice for Apollo,
‘speaking’ in an invented language, whose otherworldly utterances were
coded by Barry Anderson at IRCAM to sound god-like. By contrast,
composer Peter Ablinger’s ‘Deus Cantando (God, Singing)’ (2009) is only
one of the most recent spectral analyses of recorded speech that forms the
basis of his ‘speaking piano’, a computer-controlled player piano that
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replicates on the instrument’s eighty-eight keys the decomposed sound
spectrum of recorded human speech:
Using . . . 16 units per second (about the limit of the player piano), the original
[sound] source approaches the border of recognition within the reproduction.
With practice listening[,] the player piano can even perform structures
possible for a listener to transpose into/understand as spoken sentences.11
That is, you can ‘hear’ the piano pronounce words only when you simul-
taneously see its words or know them in advance. This accommodation of
digital sound file and keyboard mechanism has been enlisted to present
analogue voices of the dead – Schoenberg, Brecht – ‘speaking’ in the
present, and, to that end, replicates one of the initial functions of Edison’s
crank-driven phonograph, but remediated through spectral recomposition
of the source: a form of near-human expression in which the digital
(electricity) accommodates the mechanical.
In an experiential sense, such sounds perform a kind of time travel: the
piano’s hammers ‘speak’ Schoenberg’s wordsmechanically in the present. And
here it is worth reminding ourselves that mechanical work – from instrument
building to repetition in the practice room – is predicated on a principle of
fragmentation whereby larger tasks are divided up into smaller tasks that can
be performed in linear sequence. As David Hulme first noted, however, there
is no principle of causality in a mechanical sequence; movement through the
sequence generates change without oversight of how operations follow one
another. It was this blindness within mechanisms that ledMcLuhan to accord
electricity the crown of all industrial and post-industrial inventions, for ‘it
ended sequence by making things instant’ (like Brecht and Schoenberg’s
spectrally recomposed voices in the here and now). Hence his cryptic assertion
that the electric light ‘is pure information’ (McLuhan 1964, 8, 12). If the
electric grid underpinned McLuhan’s ‘global village’ of instant communica-
tions, it also models the modern network, so, beyond the supply of power,
electricity itself remains regulative of an aesthetics of digital media: ‘deeply
shaping of the form and content of the medium itself ’ (Dewdney and Ride
2006, 79). Record companies regularly take advantage of this time-travelling
instantaneity in digital editing by reusing the recordings of Pavarotti, Sinatra,
Nat King Cole, Tupac Shakur and others and ventriloquising new duets or
new backing after death, in a temporal short-circuit that appears tomake these
voices sing anew. By comparison with the macro-structure of the Internet,
Ablinger’s speaking piano is philosophically significant, in part, because of its
equal reliance on data networking and old-fashioned mechanical keys,
hammers and physical resonance. From this arises a paradox: just as the
concept of the posthuman is ultimately embedded in and defined against the
human, so the virtual is here embedded in the material.
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Case Study: Death and the Powers (2011)
But this apparently comfortable accommodation between the human and
the posthuman turns out to be unsustainable in the end, a point aptly
demonstrated by a recent piece of music theatre. Beyond the semiosis of
robotic voices, we now turn to what might be called a ‘theatrical’ semiosis
of human–digital music relations. Tod Machover and Robert Pinsky’s
Death and the Powers: A Robot Pageant is a one-act opera ‘conceived
and written specifically for the incorporation of new technologies . . . that
re-envision human presence onstage’, explains Peter Torpey, a student
designer of its multimedia systems (Torpey 2012, 110). It stages the
tensions and imaginative possibilities of a posthuman discourse vis-à-vis
digitised music, reflecting on mortality as alibi to technological necessity.
As a narrative, it depicts a critical juncture in the vision of our postbiolo-
gical future first put forward by Hans Moravec: the downloading of our
consciousness into an all-powerful computer system, and the discarding of
our original, mortal body, leading to the extinction of the human race
(Moravec 1988, 112). Tellingly, the protagonist becomes nothing but a
digitised, acousmatic voice, though we are to understand that he retains
the legal, fiscal and moral authority he held as a bodied human. The opera
emerged via MIT media lab’s ‘opera of the future’ project in 2010, and has
been performed in Monaco, Boston and Chicago to date.
First, a brief plot summary. The narrative is told from the distant future
by robots who enact the ‘pageant’ in order to try to understand what
biological death is, and how the human race died out. At the outset, four
robots debate the mystery like latter-day paleontologists:
What is this ‘Death’ – Is it a form of waste? / . . . I cannot understand. / If the
information of one unit might be lost / it is backed up by any other unit at hand.
Death – Is it an excessive cost? . . . Is it the data rearranged, / As in an error, in a
dream? . . . A dream of something lost / That was meant to be saved? (ll. 8–32)
The robots then transform themselves into the ‘human’ characters on stage,
and the action commences: Simon Powers, an aged, wealthy, wheelchair-
bound inventor and magnate, is planning his death as a transmutation of
himself into the ‘System’. He explains his philosophy of embodiment to
worried relatives by emphasising that ‘[i]t’s the vibration, / The movement,
that matters! / . . . It’s never matter that matters. Particles, molecules, cells,
fingers, eyes, nerves / Are only places for the system / Of meaningful
vibration’ (ll.122–47). Simon’s third wife (Evvy) and daughter (Miranda)
are sceptical (‘But how can you be yourself / Without a body?’ ll. 212–13),
but receive only cryptic answers in the form of poetic quotation.12 In
the second scene, Simon’s body disappears as he utters an aphoristic
existential valediction: ‘remember: / Whatever I did / I did that and /
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I am the same’ (ll. 279–81). While waiting for Simon to emerge from the
System, his adopted son and protégé, Nicholas, reflects on his own pros-
thetic enhancements and how he helped his father to live inside the system.
Simon soon emerges from a portrait of his younger self (initially as a
hologram, later as pure voice), moves around mechanically, and eventually
asserts his new identity:
What is my name? / A name is a machine. / A name is a made-up thing /
That proposes someone is real. / My name is a machine for designation –
That’s what any name is. / My name is Simon Walter Powers, / It proposes
I am alive. (ll. 347–55)
The location of his voice shifts within the scene (using 140 speakers and
spatial diffusion – Wave Field Synthesis – to pinpoint sound on stage),
between a portrait, a mechanical bird perched on set, and elsewhere in
the room. His relatives debate whether this disembodied entity is still
‘Simon’. Evvy later seeks intimate contact (and thereafter is reduced to
wordless utterances), and the family is visited by a delegation from the
‘United Way, / the Administration / And the United Nations’ (ll. 476–8),
who seek help to combat crises of world famine, biological weapons, child
exploitation and climate change in the wake of Simon’s sudden financial
liquidation. Simon merely quotes ‘O Röschen rot’ from Des Knaben
Wunderhorn, reinterpreting the lines set by Mahler without melodic
quotation: ‘I am from God and will return to God, / Dear God will give
me light, / Will light me to eternal life!’ (ll. 602–4).13 The delegation’s
stupefied response is met with an anecdote about meaningless violence
among today’s youth, and they suspect Simon may be dead, his voice a
trick. Bending Mahler’s symphonic resurrection to the ecumenical present,
Simon misreads the original poetic line by replacing ‘God’ with ‘light’ –
I am from light and will return to light – as his voice is frequency
modulated to extend into an artificially high register in a modified rising
whole tone scale. Before entering the System, Evvy declares the feeling
inside it as a giddy sense of unending freefall, perhaps gesturing to the
‘bodiless exaltation of cyberspace’ (Gibson 1984, 123). Nicholas, who has
been increasing his prosthetic enhancements, follows suit, leaving Miranda
alone in her human skin. She reflects on the unethical escape ‘into the
light’ (l. 771) of the few, and the pain of the millions, before Simon returns
as a hologram in a wheelchair (a wry technology joke) to explain the
rationale for evolving into non-biological forms:
Like you, I tried to help the world. / I, too, saw these miseries . . . / But the
animal is defective. / . . . We evolved as meat, to love fat and sugar; / Once
that was good, but now it is fatal. / We evolved as flesh to want sex all the
time; / Once that was good, but now it is fatal. / We evolved as muscle to
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want to make war; / Once that was good, but now that is lethal . . . Now
there’s no help but evolving / Out of the meat, and into the system. / It isn’t
the many and the few – / It’s yourself, it’s you! (ll. 780–807)
Miranda’s protest that misery is part of human identity – a last stand of
humanism – is followed by her anxious contemplation of a future alone,
without a huggable mother or father, with ‘no lover, no other’ (l. 822). She
defends the body, death, sugar and meat, closing with a battery of rhet-
orical questions.
In the epilogue, the robot-actors return to character as ‘operabots’ and
repeat the questions of the prologue, still with no answers. The lead robot
reiterates a message whose mindless reiteration acquires a sinister ring,
given the robots’ final incomprehension of human empathy: ‘Units
deployed as Individuals will receive / One Thousand Human Rights Status
Credits’ (ll. 924–5).14 The monotonous message, delivered ‘dry, no emo-
tion, no vibrato’, imitates the cultural topos of the robot, confirming that
all prior expression had been unreal, a calculated simulation of human
expression.
But the work performs its posthuman identity in two senses: by inviting
us to empathise with robot actors (‘operabots’) playing humans, we already
reach across the alterity relation within the opera’s narrative, even though
the robot characters are in fact played by human singers. The double
impersonation (human impersonating AI device impersonating human)
complicates the usual means of differentiating AI from human (the
so-called Turing test), for the established circularity is theoretically endless:
an identity multiplied ad absurdum. At what point, in other words, does
impersonation end and identity begin? Such ambiguity would seem
precisely the point in the impulse to render virtual speaking assistants
increasingly human-like. On the one hand, we know when the principal
singer, Powers, is offstage, it is the human actor’s movements and
breathing – detected in a booth by wireless sensors and filtered through
algorithms – that determine the vocal amplification and stage environ-
ment: its lighting, movement of props, stage scenery, etc.
Data from these sensors and the singer’s voice are streamed to custom
software for analysis and then used to drive and influence motion,
illumination and visuals throughout the theatrical environment onstage that
accompanies his amplified singing voice. (Torpey 2012, 115)
Hence the agency driving the stage effects lacks any intentionality in
performance (physical gestures offstage translate into onstage visual
effects, but not in a way that the singers can control), and to that end
might be considered more a distributed cognition than a human perform-
ance. On the other hand, at a different level of realism this is nothing but
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concealment, for humans must first learn the score and programme the
algorithms governing movement-driven stage effects. In this sense, the
doubly suspended disbelief required of an audience receives its comple-
ment in the contradictory stage identities that remain suspended between
robotic and human singers.
Staging robotic voices in this way, measured against an index of human
likeness, dramatises the relation between human and digital technology as
an agon, a conflict that has no end in sight. This dark ontology of digital
technology has lurked on the periphery of science fiction for decades, yet its
menacing predictions of loss and alienation appear no closer to fulfilment.
For sound technology the reciprocal paradigms of mimesis (composing
with algorithms) and semiosis (synthetic voices) explored in this chapter
present two ways of relating AI to human identity. Accepting relations with
devices is a fact of digital ‘assistance’ that we cannot do without; how the
indices for determining and evaluating these relations are chosen remains a
matter of debate, a debate whose framing parameters are unclear.
Media devices appear to offer a veil of neutrality, for they make no
distinction between or judgment on the sound sources they engage: animal
or human, naturally occurring or artificially produced, pop music, art
music or military explosion. There is only frequency response, bandwidth
and transistor processing speed. Yet devices have affordances that shape
the experience of users. So the flipside is that increasingly we are unaware
of the digital hand guiding our musical experience.
As illustrated by the sound and staging of digital voices, empathy
generation is at present a heavily gendered, commercial enterprise, from
Hilary’s respect for cognitive psychology in Stoppard’s play, to the ubiquity
of female-sounding digital assistants, and the opposition of a female-body
versus male-brain (Miranda, Simon) in Machover’s opera. The extent to
which we are troubled or indifferent to this matters less, perhaps, than the
knowledge that the role of digital media in musical creativity can only
grow, and with it the responsibility to monitor such developments.
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